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1. INTRODUCTION
As the second decade of the 21st century started in the EU, the problems in its 
labour market became apparent,1 with the unemployment rate exceeding 10%, far 
above other developed regions of the world. Asymmetries in unemployment lev-
els did not only persist, but became wider as the economic crisis hit the continent. 
These asymmetries appeared mainly, but not only, across the different Member 
States (MS). There was a gap of 20 percentage points between the two MSs with 
the highest and lowest unemployment rates. But asymmetries arose also across 
other dimensions of the labour market, which indicate that despite the fact that 
more than 26 million people were unemployed in the EU, there were significant 
skill mismatches on Europe’s labour market and, paradoxically, a high level of 
unfilled vacancies continue to persist. 
Youth unemployment rate was more than twice as high as the adult one. The 
EU was determined to undertake policy actions in order to rectify this trend. On 
February 8, 2013, the European Council proposed to carry out the Youth Em-
ployment Initiative that was intended to support young unemployed citizens in 
regions with a particularly high level of youth unemployment rate (above 25%). 
For this purpose, the European Council allocated a budget of €6 billion for the 
period 2014–2020, one-half of which will be channelled through the European 
Social Fund (ESF). 
The ESF is one of the tools of Structural Actions, and is devoted to promote 
public expenditures for Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). The ESF was 
set up under the Treaty of Rome, and its importance as a fiscal and a policy tool 
has been increasing, in parallel to the other Structural Actions. The growing im-
portance of the ESF, in particular, and the ALMPs that the ESF is intended to 
boost, make imperative the necessity of identifying to what extent they are effec-
tive in lowering unemployment rates.
For this purpose, we first analyse the main trends governing the evolution of 
the ESF. Then, we construct and estimate an econometric model that evaluates 
the impact of ALMPs public expenditure on the employment rate, using panel 
data from the MSs for the period 1985–2011. In order to focus our attention 
on those MSs with more problematic labour markets, the analysis distinguishes 
between countries highly subsidised by the ESF and those countries that receive 
relatively less funds. We conclude that ALMPs are more efficient precisely in the 
countries with more problematic labour markets. This result supports the recent 
strategy of the EU of reinforcing the ESF as a tool to enhance social cohesion 
across European countries. 
1  Information and data mentioned in the Introduction have been extracted from Eurostat and 
European Commission (2013).
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2. THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND AS A FISCAL TOOL TO ENLARGE 
PUBLIC SPENDING IN ALMPs
The ESF’s original task was to promote employment and the geographical and 
occupational mobility of workers within the Community.2 The ESF was founded 
upon the principles of the Fund for the Retraining and Resettlement of Work-
ers, its predecessor in the European Coal and Steel Community. During its first 
two decades, due to the low levels of unemployment in the European Economic 
Community, the ESF was devoted to facilitating the migration of workers and to 
retrain people who had suffered accidents at work (European Commission 2007). 
The importance of the ESF on the European economy was minor during this pe-
riod, representing around 1% of the total budget and less than 0.01% of GDP.3
2  The great majority of the Funds are devoted to finance Active Labour Market Policies, as ana-
lysed in European Commission (2010). The ESF regulation describes the particular conditions 
of the projects financed for every programming period (The Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
2052 / 88 of June 24, 1988, The Regulation (EC) No. 1784/1999 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of July 12, 1999, on the European Social Fund, and Regulation (EC) No. 
1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 5, 2006, on the European 
Social Fund), and they refer mostly to ALMPs-related projects. 
3  The Structural Funds represented altogether around 5% of the total European Communities 
budget during the 1960s (European Communities 2009), which in turn represented around 
0.5% of the GDP of the 6 MSs.
Figure 1. Evolution of the European Structural Funds (as a share of the total budget 
of the European Communities/ European Union)
Sources: Own compilation from the EU budget (several years) Financial Report, Eurostat, and OECD.
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The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) created in 1975 devoted to 
promote infrastructure in regions lagging behind. The ESF and ERDF are referred 
to as “Structural Funds”. Initially, MSs implemented projects that were re-funded 
afterwards, but as access to Fund started to cover wider policy areas, a system 
of prior approval was introduced (Bache et al. 2011). Although Italy, the United 
Kingdom, and France were the main beneficiaries of the allocation of the ESF in 
absolute terms during these years, the allocation of funds per inhabitant were clear-
ly focused towards Ireland whose advantage over the other MSs was remarkable. 
The size of the Fund was consequently enlarged, as Portugal and Greece 
joined Ireland4 as main recipient states. The Structural Funds were substantially 
reformed in 1988, with the purpose of moving from individual projects to multi-
annual partnerships between the MSs and the Commission. This reform also in-
cluded an increase in the financial weight of the ESF.5 The new approach was 
4  In terms of GDP, Ireland (0.86%) and Portugal (0.50%) were the greatest beneficiaries, while 
Luxembourg (0.02%) and Netherlands (0.03%) were the least favoured.
5  For this programming period, in terms of GDP, Ireland (0.69%) and Greece (0.43%) were at 
the top of the list, while Luxembourg (0.01%) and Denmark (0.02%) were at the bottom. 
Figure 2. Allocation of the ESF: Programming period 1974–1982, 1984–1987, 1989–1993 
Average annual allocation per inhabitant (in per capita ECU)
Sources: Commission of the European Communities (1983), Report and proposals on ways of increasing the 
effectiveness of the Community’s structural Funds, Brussels, OPOCE COM (83) 501 (Commitments); Commis-
sion of the European Communities (1989), Guide to the reform of the Community’s structural Funds, OPOCE: 
Brussels ISBN: 92-826-0029-7 (Commitments) and Commission of the European Communities (1990), Annual 
report on the implementation of the reform of the Structural Funds 1989, Brussels EC (COM(90) 516 final).
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built on four basic principles: Concentration, in determined regions or policy ob-
jectives; partnership, with national, regional, or local authorities; programming, 
setting the priorities and allocation for each period (5–7 years); and additionality, 
as the funds were not intended to replace, but to increase national funds. As long 
as the ESF is mainly involved with ALMPs, the principle of additionality applied 
to the ESF implies that the transfers are intended to encourage larger public ex-
penditure in subsidies policies. 
In 1992, the Single Market reached its completion and the way towards the sin-
gle currency was clearer. The review of the Structural Funds in 1993 was focused 
towards strengthening economic and social cohesion, and its budgets were almost 
doubled for the period 1994–1999.6 The ESF was targeted to increase competi-
tiveness and to prevent unemployment through education and training activities 
focused on workers with higher risk of exclusion such as young job-seekers or 
6  The average allocation, as a share of GDP, did not change substantially for the countries with 
the higher subsidies, namely Portugal (0.64%) and Ireland (0.62%). However, this is not the 
case for those countries with lower subsidies, namely Luxembourg (0.03%) and Denmark 
(0.03%). 
Figure 3. Allocation of the ESF: Programming periods 1994–1998, 2000–2006, and 2007–2013 
Average annual allocation per inhabitant (in per capita Euro)
Sources: European Commission (1999), The Structural Funds in 1998 10th Annual report, OPOCE: Brussels 
COM(99) 467 final (Commitments); Commission of the European Communities (2004), 15th Annual report on 
the implementation of the Structural Funds 2003, Brussels COM(2004) 721 final (Initial allocations) and ESF 
Database portal at http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=440&langId=en#opt1 (ESF Initial financial alloca-
tions as at 31.12.2007).
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long-term unemployed within the framework of the Commission’s White paper 
on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. 
The ESF was geared towards supporting the European Employment Strategy 
as a part of the Lisbon Strategy at the beginning of the 21st century.7 The ESF 
would then target the four pillars of the European Employment Strategy: enhanc-
ing the skills and flexibility of the workforce; development of active labour mar-
ket measures in order to prevent youth long-term unemployment; development 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises by enhancing entrepreneurship potential; 
and promoting equal opportunity and preventing social exclusion within the la-
bour market. 
The programming period 2007–2013 involved the substantial reorganisation 
of the Cohesion Policy.8 The rules were simplified and the Funds were targeted 
specifically towards the promotion of competitiveness and employment creation. 
The link of the ESF with the European Employment Strategy was strengthened 
and the Fund’s priorities focused on convergence and employment objectives 
(European Commission 2007b). 
7  For the programming period 2000–2006, the countries with a larger allocation of ESF relative 
to the size of their economy were Portugal (0.45%) and Greece (0.36%). The lowest alloca-
tions were for Luxembourg (0.03%) and Denmark (0.03%).
8  As a share of GDP, during the programming period 2007–2013, the countries with larger 
transfers are Hungary (0.53%) and Bulgaria (0.46%), and those with lower are Luxembourg 
(0.01%) and Denmark (0.01%).
Figure 4. Public expenditure in ALMPs: 1994–1999, 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 (% of GDP)
Sources: Eurostat and OECD Employment database.
ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN THE EU 339
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
The key question, at this point, is to assess whether the ESF has been effective 
in raising ALMPs expenditures in the subsidised countries. This issue is beyond 
the scope of this paper and is, in fact, a very relevant – but complicated – point to 
address. We may, however, give a brief overview of the comparison and evolu-
tion of the level of public expenditures on ALMPs, making use of the dataset used 
to estimate the models presented later.
 Figure 4 was designed to make an intuitive visual comparison with Figure 3. 
We could identify, broadly, three main groups of countries: first we have a group 
of core European countries in which, with the remarkable exception of the UK, 
public expenditure on ALMPs is larger; next, we see the older member states of 
the periphery that are devoting around 0.5% of their GDP to publicly-promot-
ed ALMPs, with Greece lagging behind; and, finally, the New Member States 
(NMS) with a far smaller effort, but some of them responding positively to their 
use of the Structural Funds. Although it is difficult to know to what extent these 
figures are the result of the implementation of the ESF and its inertia, Figure 4 
nonetheless illustrates the size of the gap in the level of performance across 
countries. 
3. MODELLING THE IMPACT OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
This paper makes use of a panel data model in order to estimate the impact of 
ALMPs on employment in two sub-groups of EU countries. This section includes 
a brief review of previous studies using a similar empirical approach with a dou-
ble purpose: firstly, it shows that the increasing interest of the EC (described 
in the previous section) in fostering public expenditures on ALMPs responds to 
the growing evidence that ALMPs improve labour market performance; and sec-
ondly, previous results will motivate the use of variables and the econometric 
modelling described in the next sections. 
Jackman et al. (1990) found for a panel of 14 OECD economies during the 
period 1970–1988 that ALMPs have a significant impact on unemployment (oth-
er studies are Layard et al. 1991; Zetterberg 1995). OECD (1993) revealed that 
previous results were sensitive to the measure of ALMPs, so that when this vari-
able is expressed as a ratio over the number of unemployed, it could be highly 
correlated with the dependent variable (unemployment rate), leading to spurious 
correlation. Forslund – Krueger (1997) also made a critical revision of previous 
estimations in which they identified a source of simultaneity bias between unem-
ployment and expenditure on ALMPs and a possible change in the relationship 
between both variables during the 1990s. Elmeskov et al. (1998) addressed the 
simultaneity bias by averaging their indicator of expenditure on ALMPs over the 
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whole period, while Nickell – Layard (1999) used one-period lagged values of 
expenditure on ALMPs. In both cases, the impact of ALMPs on unemployment 
seems less relevant than in previous studies. 
Blanchard – Wolfers (2000) interacted labour market institutional variables 
with adverse shocks in the form of time dummies for five-year averaged vari-
ables, and concluded that the heterogeneity observed in unemployment among 
OECD countries depends on the interaction of common shocks with idiosyncratic 
institutional variables (the interaction of institutional variables is widely analysed 
in Basasini – Duval 2009), among which the size of ALMPs is included. The 
branch of the literature focusing on the institutional determinants of unemploy-
ment has been quite prolific during the first decade of the 21st century (see, for 
example, Baccaro – Rei 2005; Nickel et al. 2005; Sachs 2012) and their results 
have motivated the inclusion of institutional variables among the set of controls 
in studies analysing the impact of ALMPs.
Other studies (Hujer – Caliendo 2000; Hujer – Zeiss 2003) related the number 
of hirings to the number of vacancies, the unemployed, and other control vari-
ables, among which ALMPs are included. The use of an indicator of the outflows 
from unemployment to employment as the dependent variable has the advantage 
that this variable internalises the displacement effects (crowding-out) of ALMPs, 
that is, it accounts also for the substitution of workers indicated by the policy. 
Estevao (2007) estimated the determinants of employment rate in the private 
sector and included expenditure on ALMPs as a share of GDP, arguing that nor-
malising this variable by unemployment might bias the results because aggre-
gate output shocks could affect both variables simultaneously, provoking spuri-
ous correlation. He concluded, for a panel of 16 OECD countries (1985–2000) 
that ALMP were very effective in increasing business employment rates in the 
1990s. 
Boone – van Ours (2009) distinguished several types of ALMPs in a panel data 
of 20 OECD countries (1985–1999) and concluded that the impact on unemploy-
ment (and on the employment/population rate) varies significantly among catego-
ries of ALMPs. More recent studies such as Vis (2012) and Váradi (2013) suggest 
the introduction of a correction to the – disaggregated – subcategories of ALMPs 
expenditure by reporting figures in relative terms to covered population. 
4. DATA AND VARIABLES
We use country-level yearly data in order to estimate the impact of ALMPs on the 
employment rate. For this purpose, we use data from an unbalanced panel of 28 
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European countries9 for the time period 1985–2012. The sample was divided into 
two subsamples with the purpose of distinguishing between two different groups 
of countries: on the one hand, we consider the core countries, which are the central 
and northern older MSs, reporting a better performance in their labour markets 
(and, therefore, receiving lower ESF support); on the other hand, we include the 
NMSs and the periphery, which are countries that experienced high unemploy-
ment rates or other labour market-related problems (they, accordingly, received 
larger ESF transfers relative to their size).
Variable description and sources are described in Tables 1 and 2. The depend-
ent variable is the employment rate in the population aged 16–64, and it has 
been retrieved from the Eurostat database, although some observations have been 
extracted from the “Population and Labour Force” dataset which is part of the 
“Annual Labour Force Statistics” (ALFS) compiled by the OECD (the compat-
ibility between both sources has been examined on the basis of simultaneous 
observations). 
The first decision to take when building a model that tries to estimate the 
impact of ALMP is the selection of the dependent variable to be included in the 
model. Originally, most studies10 used the unemployment rate. However, inspired 
 9  The database also includes Norway, which is not a member state of the EU, but it is a member 
of the EEA. The EEA is not involved in the EU Regional policy directly, but it does participate 
in EU programmes related to Employment and Social protection (among other objectives) 
through the so-called EEA Grants and Norway Grants. Croatia was not included in, because 
she was not a MS in 2012. 
10 See Chapple (1999) for a survey of pioneering studies.
 Table 2. Summary statistics
Periphery countries Core countries
Variable Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max.
emprate 379 60.85 6.4 45.4 81.3 267 68.31 6.6 52.5 81.5
ALMP 294 0.37 0.28 0.02 1.47 252 0.79 0.49 0.04 2.52
PLMP 296 0.97 0.88 0.08 5.42 257 1.61 1.01 0.16 5.45
tfp 381 92.58 10.6 57.2 115.9 280 92.03 8.3 72.0 104.6
tot 414 98.59 7.0 64.0 128.5 280 97.99 9.8 60.1 123.9
lodgdppc 411 9.03 0.9 6.0 10.7 273 10.17 0.4 9.2 11.3
pexp 380 43.46 6.6 24.3 78.1 256 50.02 6.0 36.3 71.7
compempl 394 10.96 2.2 2.9 17.7 261 12.06 2.9 7.1 19.4
labprod 387 90.22 17.5 42.2 132.2 271 88.92 11.8 60.9 106.4
emprotection 290 2.31 0.9 0.9 4.2 280 2.37 0.8 0.6 3.5
tradeundens 297 32.87 17.4 7.1 80.7 280 43.26 21.4 7.6 83.9
taxwedge 272 40.66 6.5 22.2 54.5 280 43.93 7.1 29.5 56.9
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by the survey of the literature,11 we used the employment rate over the total work-
ing age population as the dependent variable of our model.
The explanatory variable on which we focus our interest is “Active Labour 
Market Policies”. The level of public expenditure12 on ALMPs is expressed as 
a share of GDP. “Passive Labour Market policies” (PLMPs) is also included 
among the set of explanatory variables, as PLMPs have been clearly identified as 
a strong (positive) determinant of unemployment by previous studies. The main 
data source is Eurostat, although some observations have been retrieved from the 
OECD Employment database. Fiscal data are collected for the general public sec-
tor, which includes all the levels of the public administration, as the distribution 
of fiscal competencies is extremely heterogeneous across EU Member States. 
Regarding the use of other control variables, the set of variables used in previ-
ous panel data studies has been extremely heterogeneous as a result of the differ-
ent hypotheses taken into account. We include a set of macroeconomic indicators 
and a set of institutional indicators, inspired by the review of the relevant litera-
ture and preliminary estimations. 
Our macroeconomic indicators used as explanatory variables are total factor 
productivity, the terms of trade, per capita GDP (expressed in logs), public ex-
penditure (as a share of GDP), compensation of employees in the general gov-
ernment (as a share of GDP), and labour productivity. These have been retrieved 
from Eurostat and Ameco databases. 
Finally, and inspired by the importance that some studies set on variables cap-
turing institutional settings of the labour market (see, for example, the findings 
described in Flaig – Rottmann 2013), we also considered some institutional vari-
ables taken from the OECD Employment database: the employment protection 
11  Scarpetta (1996) finds that ALMPs may increase the labour force participation rate, which 
suggests that the use of a ratio of unemployed people over working age population (or, alter-
natively, its inverse, the employment rate) would capture more accurately the desired effect 
(Nickell – Layard 1999). Hujer et al. (2004) use the rate of job seekers expressed as the ratio be-
tween unemployed plus participants in ALMPs over the total labour force. Estevao (2007) uses 
the share of working age population employed in the business sector (employment rate in the 
business sector). OECD (1993) uses the employment rate. Altavilla – Caroleo (2006) use al-
ternatively unemployment rate, employment rate, and youth unemployment rate. Hujer – Zeiss 
(2003), instead, use the outflow from unemployment into regular employment relative to the 
labour force in order to internalise also displacement effects. Hagen (2003) uses the unemploy-
ment rate, the matching function approach as in Hujer – Zeiss (2003), and the ratio of regular 
employment to the labour force as three alternative dependent variables to be analysed.
12  Public expenditure is inclusive of EU subsidies aimed at fostering spending on particular 
policies such as the European Social Fund. EU transfers enter in the budget of the – national, 
regional or local – public administration as an income in the revenue side and as part of the 
expenditure in the particular projects co-financed by the EU. 
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index, the trade union density variable, and the average tax wedge. The availabili-
ty of institutional variables is very limited for the group of periphery countries. In 
addition, their time persistence makes their level of significance very poor when 
using annual data. For these reasons, the role of institutional variables is analysed 
in a robustness check, whose results are reported in the Appendix. 
5. ESTIMATIONS AND RESULTS
5.1. Econometric modelling
We build and estimate a panel data model in which the employment rate is the 
dependent variable and the level of public expenditure on active labour market 
policies is among the set of explanatories: 
Employmentit = ρ Employmentit-1 + β1ALMPit + β2PLMPit + γ mit +μi+λt +εit (1)
where Employmentit is the employment rate in country i at time t, ALMP and 
PLMP are the level of public expenditure as a share of GDP in active and pas-
sive labour market policies respectively. mit is a vector of macroeconomic vari-
ables affecting the level of unemployment. It includes total factor productivity, 
terms of trade, the level of per capita production (in logarithmic form) and, in an 
extended version of the model, also the level of public expenditure as a share of 
GDP, labour productivity, and the level of public compensation of employees. An 
extension of the original model, reported in the Appendix, includes, in addition, a 
vector of institutional variables among the set of explanatories: the employment 
protection index, the trade union density variable and the average tax wedge; μi 
is the country specific term and λt are the time-dummies. A specification of the 
model substitutes the time-dummies for a unit specific linear time-trend. 
We estimated the coefficients using the one-step version of the system GMM 
estimator (Arellano – Bover 1995; Blundell – Bond 1998) instead of the two-step 
procedure.13 The use of this estimator captures two important features: firstly, it 
is able to capture the dynamic behaviour of the variables, as our dependent vari-
able seems to be strongly time-persistent; and, secondly, the GMM estimate also 
13  This is based on the findings of Judson – Owen (1996), applied to the length of the cross-
section and time dimensions of our dataset. The system GMM estimator improves the effi-
ciency of the “difference GMM” estimator (Arellano – Bond 1991) by introducing additional 
assumptions of no correlation between the fixed-effects and the first differences of the instru-
menting variables. 
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controls for the endogeneity of the control by using the lagged values of the levels 
of the endogenous and the predetermined variables as instruments. Some of our 
control variables and, in particular, the variable on which we focus our atten-
tion (ALMPs) could be endogenous, as the levels of employment could drive the 
share of the public budget devoted to active labour market policies. Ignoring this 
reverse causality issue might lead to the overestimation of the causal relationship 
in the other direction.14 It is necessary to test for the validity of the instruments 
as well as for the presence of serial correlation in the residuals once the equation 
has been estimated.
The model was estimated introducing the variables in first differences. This 
is motivated by the suspicion that most variables could be non-stationary, as re-
vealed by preliminary estimations of the equation in levels and the examination 
of their residuals. The outcome of the Im et al. (2003) unit root test is also re-
ported in the Appendix (Table A1). The tests15 reinforce the hypothesis that most 
variables might be I(1), except for loggdppc.
Alternatively, we might think that the omission of relevant dynamics in the 
model is the source of the complications observed in the estimation in levels. It 
seems reasonable to assume that employment in a given period may be correlated 
with past trends in other macroeconomic variables. Parameter estimates based on 
a static estimator are biased and inconsistent if the true model is not static. For 
that reason, we propose a panel data model that includes unobserved country-
specific effects and allow for the existence of lagged values of the explanatory 
variables, in addition to the lagged values of the dependent variable. We want 
to allow for the possibility that the variations of past control variables may still 
affect current variations in employment. The specification of this equation to be 
estimated from panel data can be expressed as an ARDL (autoregressive distrib-
uted lag) model:
Employmentit = ρrEmploymentit-r + β1CONTROLit + β2 CONTROLit-1 +
 + μi +λt +εit (2)
where CONTROL is a vector of variables including ALMP, PLMP, and the vari-
ables included in m. Long-term relationships between the variables may be easily 
derived from the estimation of this equation. Equation (2) is, again, estimated 
using the one-step Arellano – Bond (1991) GMM estimator, and in the presence 
14  The estimations reported assume that the variables ALMP and PLMP could be endogenous, 
while the remaining variables are assumed to be predetermined. 
15  Results, however, should be interpreted with caution in the light of the performance revealed by 
the Monte Carlo experiments for the panel dimensions under consideration (Im et al. 2003).
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of a common time trend or unit-specific time trends as alternatives to the time 
dummies λt.
The interpretation of the estimation of the ARDL model represented by equa-
tion (2) is not straightforward. Very often, the two coefficients attached to the 
same variable (in levels and one period lagged) differ substantially in terms of 
size and significance level. This makes it difficult to assess whether a variable 
has a significant impact on the dependent variable, as well as the size of the im-
pact. For that reason, long-run coefficients are constructed from the outcome of 
estimating equation (2). Assuming an economy in its steady state, with a constant 
employment rate and a constant value of the explanatory variables over time, we 
can work out long-term coefficients:
 βlongterm = (β1 + β2) / (1 – ρrEmploymentit-r). (3)
Standard errors for coefficients obtained with this procedure may be easily 
computed using Stata. They are computed applying a delta method. A general 
discussion of this method can be found in Wooldridge (2002). βlongterm represents, 
therefore, the difference between the level of the dependent variable in both 
steady states, before and after the unitary increase of the dependent variable. 
5.2. Results
Tables 3 and 4 show the results obtained while running identical estimations, but 
after splitting the sample into two subsamples of similar size.16 Table 3 presents 
results for the 18 countries of the periphery, whose labour market perform-
ance is relatively worse,17 while Table 4 presents similar results for the 10 core 
countries 18. 
The estimates assume four alternative models with respect to the control vari-
ables included. Firstly, we introduced only the variables that are common to most 
16  The criterion used for the allocation of EU countries across core and periphery is precisely 
the relative distribution of the European Social Fund among countries in per capita terms, as 
the ESF is allocated according to indicators of labour market performance. The two groups 
created are similar in terms of GDP and population. 
17  These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ire-
land, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovenia, and Slovakia, 
although some units are dropped for estimating longer versions of the model due to poor data 
availability. 
18  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
and United Kingdom.
ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN THE EU 347
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
of the reviewed literature; secondly, labour productivity is introduced as an al-
ternative to total factor productivity; thirdly, we considered also other macroeco-
nomic variables that could drive employment rates such as public expenditure 
and compensation of employees; and, finally, we considered only variables that 
show clear statistical significance. Column 5 assumes, over the baseline model of 
column 1, the presence of time dummies, while column 6 introduces, instead, a 
country-specific linear time trend.
At this stage, it is relevant to mention two important points in order to inter-
pret fiscal variables. The first point refers to the findings of several studies on 
Table 3. Determinants of employment rate in periphery countries. First differences
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
empratet-1 0.46450*** 0.4528*** 0.4953*** 0.4491*** 0.4263*** 0.4644***
0.032 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.041 0.034
ALMP 1.7597*** 2.0737*** 1.7576*** 1.9056*** 1.5798*** 1.6686***
0.570 0.592 0.589 0.600 0.593 0.611
PLMP –2.4125*** –2.8604*** –2.3600*** –2.5019*** –2.3166*** –2.4456***
0.195 0.191 0.222 0.202 0.228 0.208
tfp 0.1917*** 0.1727*** 0.1753*** 0.1007*** 0.1941***
0.020 0.023 0.020 0.027 0.022
labprod 0.0818***
0.018
tot –0.0073 –0.0135 –0.0109 0.026 –0.0118
0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.024
lodgdppc 0.1891 0.1022 0.1394 0.1759 0.2693
0.114 0.116 0.112 0.120 0.224
pexp 0.0209
0.025
compempl –0.2845**
0.115
Sargan test 
(p-value) [1] 398.6 (.25) 441.8 (.02) 385.9 (.54) 356.5 (.24) 358.9 (.44) 355.8 (.59)
Autocorr. Test 
(p-value) [2] –3.02 (.00) –3.02 (.00) –3.09 (.00) –3.11 (.00) –3.25 (.00) –2.99 (.00)
–0.66 (.50) –1.41 (.15) –0.68 (.49) –0.88 (.37) –0.54 (.58) –0.65 (.51)
time dummies no no no no yes no
country-
specific time 
trend
no no no no no yes
Obs. (groups) 257 (18) 261 (18) 246 (18) 259 (18) 257 (18) 257 (18))
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
[1] Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.
[2] Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation (of order 1 and order 2) in the error term.
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the growth effect of fiscal variables (Kneller et al. 1999), which showed that 
the interpretation of the coefficients associated to fiscal variables must take into 
account the implicit budgetary assumptions. In our estimation, for example, the 
coefficient associated to the variable public expenditure estimates the impact on 
employment of an increase in public expenditure financed by the omitted fiscal 
variables (tax revenues or budgetary deficit). 
The second point, also in line with the growth literature,19 refers to the fact that 
the final impact of an increase of a fiscal variable depends on its current level. 
19 See, for example, Afonso et al. (2011).
Table 4. Determinants of employment rate in core countries. First differences
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
empratet-1 0.2725*** 0.2345*** 0.1892*** 0.2764*** 0.2361*** 0.2467***
0.041 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.047 0.043
ALMP –0.4265 –0.3734 –0.0839 –0.4924 –.07204* –0.6113
0.368 0.362 0.375 0.375 0.422 0.385
PLMP –2.4639*** –2.6673*** –2.2693*** –2.4030*** –1.9746*** –2.5622
0.244 0.225 0.250 0.249 0.312 0.255
tfp 0.0185 –0.0564 0.0081 0.0327 0.0138
0.032 0.038 0.031 0.050 0.033
labprod –0.0553**
0.025
tot 0.0065 0.0042 –0.0301* 0.0054 0.0075
0.015 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.015
lodgdppc –0.1848 –0.2648** –0.2637** –0.1814 –0.2798
0.134 0.132 0.128 0.272 0.526
pexp –0.0589*
0.033
compempl –0.1344
0.176
Sargan test 
(p-value) [1] 344.6 (.67) 349.0 (.57) 403.9 (.22) 311.2 (436) 316.3 (.72) 316.9 (.87)
Autocorr. Test 
(p-value) [2] –2.79 (.00) –2.78 (.00) –2.74 (.00) –2.77 (.00) –2.82 (.00) –2.79 (.00)
–0.44 (.65) –0.38 (.70) –0.47 (.63) –0.40 (.68) –0.13 (.89) –0.50 (.61)
time dummies no no no no yes no
country-specific 
time trend no no no no no yes
Obs. (groups) 227 (10) 225 (10) 216 (10) 227 (10) 227 (10) 227 (10)
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
[1] Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.
[2] Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation (of order 1 and order 2) in the error term.
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Increasing a type of public expenditure may have a positive impact on economic 
growth or employment up to a certain level, at which probably additional in-
creases seem to have an insignificant impact. If the level of public expenditure in 
that category increased far above this threshold, its relationship with employment 
and growth might become negative. Therefore, when we estimate an insignificant 
coefficient associated to a fiscal variable, this could reflect the fact that the level 
of this variable is currently near its optimum. 
The comparison of both tables yields an interesting result: while public ex-
penditure on ALMPs seems to be a significant determinant of employment rate 
in the periphery, its significance gets weaker for the core countries.20 That might 
reflect the fact that the level of public expenditure on ALMPs is below its opti-
mum level in the periphery, which justifies additional policy measures such as 
continuing ESF transfers to foster larger ALMPs expenditure. As for the core 
countries, their larger level of ALMPs expenditure seems to yield no additional 
benefit on employment, at least compared to other types of public expenditure. 
In terms of size, we can notice that the coefficient attached to ALMPs is simi-
lar, slightly lower, compared to the coefficients estimated in Estevao (2007) and 
slightly higher to those in Estevao (2003). In both cases, the estimations cover a 
sub-set of OECD countries.
Regarding other explanatory variables, the increase in the employment rate is 
still strongly time persistent, as it seems to be driven by its own value in the pre-
vious period with a coefficient around 0.3. The coefficient estimated for PLMPs 
suggests that a one percent increase (over GDP) of public expenditure in passive 
labour market policies could induce a 2 percentage point decrease in the employ-
ment rate. The size of the coefficients for PLML is also similar to the ones esti-
mated in Estevao (2003, 2007), although the variability of the coefficient to the 
alternative specifications is smaller in our case.
While total factor productivity improvements seem to foster the employment 
rate in peripheral countries, the impact of labour productivity growth on the em-
ployment rate seems less obvious. Both results, although contradictory, are also 
intuitive.21 Larger multifactor productivity foments more activity and, therefore, 
demands further labour supply while, simultaneously, higher labour productivity 
diminishes the amount of labour necessary to sustain the level of production. The 
contribution of the other control variables is more controversial, as the level of 
significance of the coefficients estimated are quite poor. Finally, the contribution 
20  A similar result is found in Furceri – Zdzienicka (2012), who estimate the impact of ALMPs 
on GDP growth in a set of OECD countries, finding no significant effects, in contrast to other 
categories of social spending. 
21 In line with the literature, see Basanini (2008).
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of the time dummies or the country-specific time trends to improve the estimation 
seems marginal according to the estimates shown in these tables.
Regarding the institutional variables, although many other studies have un-
derlined their contribution to the level of equilibrium employment22 in the labour 
market, their impact may be partially absorbed by the unit-specific term in this 
estimation, as they are highly time persistent (at least according to the time fre-
quency considered in this paper). For that reason, institutional variables have 
been removed from the original model, although a robustness check – reported in 
22 See, for example, Nunziata (2002).
Table 5. Determinants of employment rate in periphery countries. Long-term coefficients
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ALMP 24.206*** 24.433*** 19.678*** 29.480*** 25.916*** 25.941***
6.377 5.852 6.883 7.312 6.191 7.965
PLMP –7.9924*** –8.4417*** –5.0672** –9.0526*** –8.1432*** –9.3131***
1.628 1.540 2.050 2.212 1.642 1.916
tfp 0.2798** 0.2644** 0.4090*** 0.3630** 0.3786*
0.114 0.124 0.127 0.149 0.196
labprod 0.0782
0.061
tot 0.0337 –0.0311 0.1855 0.1971 0.0971
0.144 0.130 0.179 0.142 0.197
lodgdppc 3.2447 4.2897** 3.0647 3.9373** 0.8235
2.001 1.829 2.110 1.916 3.608
pexp –0.8491***
0.243
compempl 0.8207
0.644
Sargan test 
(p-value) [1] 403.6 (.08) 442.8 (.00) 388.2 (.28) 356.1 (.10) 358.1 (.26) 359.1 (.32)
Autocorr. Test 
(p-value) [2] –3.15(.00) –3.34 (.00) –3.27 (.00) –2.96 (.00) –3.27 (.00) –3.06 (.00)
–1.12 (.25) –1.53 (.12) –1.27 (.20) –0.72 (.46) –0.90 (.36) –1.16 (.24)
time dummies no no no no yes no
country-specific 
time trend no no no no no yes
Obs. (groups) 252 (18) 256 (18) 241 (18) 253 (18) 252 (18) 252 (18)
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
[1] Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.
[2] Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation (of order 1 and order 2) in the error term.
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the Appendix (Table A2) – reveals that the inclusion of institutional variables does 
not significantly alter the results reported here. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the long-term coefficients estimated through equation 
(3), from the coefficients obtained in the estimation of equation (2) using the 
same GMM estimator (Arellano – Bover 1995) and including the variables in lev-
els. Therefore, the absolute values of the coefficients23 are not comparable with 
those in Tables 3 and 4, which are obtained with variables in first-differences. 
However, regarding the sign and significance levels of the estimated coefficients, 
23  The size of the coefficients may seem large, but we have to keep in mind that ALMPs (and also 
PLMPs) expenditure represent less than 1% of GDP in most countries. 
Table 6. Determinants of employment rate in core countries. Long-term coefficients
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ALMP 0.3093 0.1207 1.421 –3.7089 0.2366 0.7275
3.234 3.012 3.949 4.061 2.577 2.860
PLMP –1.3406 –1.2118 1.1278 –3.5392* 0.9296 –1.4546
1.678 1.529 1.725 1.841 1.380 1.429
tfp 0.1984 0.1121 –0.0186 –0.3053 –0.0773
0.228 0.231 0.149 0.250 0.292
labprod 0.2767
0.176
tot –0.1665 –0.1984* –.3300** –0.1352 –0.1574*
0.115 0.105 0.138 0.086 0.091
lodgdppc –3.0783 –8.7886 –1.528 –1.1307 0.6895
5.527 6.265 5.237 4.747 12.660
pexp –0.444
0.358
compempl –0.1789
0.746
Sargan test 
(p-value) [1] 343.8 (.55) 355.3 (.64) 384.6 (.32) 266.9 (.92) 303.5 (.78) 322.8 (.71)
Autocorr. test 
(p-value) [2] –2.71 (.00) –2.82 (.00) –2.58 (.00) –2.80 (.00) –2.76 (.00) –2.67 (.00)
–0.18 (.84) –0.12 (.90) –0.26 (.79) –0.26 (.79) –0.24 (.80) –0.15 (.87)
time dummies no no no no yes no
country-specific 
time trend no no no no no yes
Obs. (groups) 225 (10) 223 (10) 214 (10) 225 (10) 225 (10) 225 (10)
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
[1] Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.
[2] Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation (of order 1 and order 2) in the error term.
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the results are not contradictory to those obtained from equation (1). In fact, the 
distance between the coefficients associated to ALMPs and other fiscal variables 
becomes more evident. The coefficient associated to the variable ALMP is posi-
tively significant only for periphery countries. As for the other control variables, 
we observe poorer levels of significance in general. 
Our results do reinforce the hypothesis that ALMPs expenditure is more effec-
tive in the countries of the periphery, in which the current level of expenditure is 
actually lower. At this stage, it is necessary to assess to what extent this is a new 
finding. There are many studies24 revealing the positive relationship of ALMPs 
to employment growth. With a few exceptions, however, these rarely25 compare 
performance across groups of countries. Elkmesov et al. (1998), for example, 
introduce an interaction term in a robustness check that captures the relationship 
of unemployment benefits with a dummy representing three alternative groups 
of countries according to their level of ALMPs expenditure (low, intermediate, 
or high), within their sample of 20 OECD countries (1983–1994). Their results 
reveal a better performance of unemployment benefits (PLMPs) for the group of 
intermediate ALMPs spending and the worst performance for the group of coun-
tries with a low level of ALMPs expenditure.26 Estevao (2007) uses a sample of 
16 OECD countries and he also estimates a larger coefficient for the subsample 
that excludes the Nordic countries, which are precisely those with a larger level 
of public expenditure on ALMPs. In both cases, the results presented in this paper 
are consistent with those in other studies, although not fully comparable. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
The EU is searching for economic recipes that accelerate the exit from the pro-
longed recession and minimise the short-term impact on unemployment, which 
is already far above the socially acceptable level. One of the strategies has been 
the provision of an additional fiscal stimulus to Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs), distributed through the ESF, in order to tackle the high level of youth 
24  Some results have been already introduced in Section 3. A review of previous results with 
country-level data can be found in Calmfors et al. (2002)
25  Other studies investigating the impact of EU transfers on employment – mostly at the regional 
level – discriminate across units according to their eligibility to access the Funds (see Becker 
et al. 2010; Mohl – Hagen 2011). Their results, although more optimistic when related to the 
performance of economic growth, do reveal a poor impact of EU transfers on employment 
growth. 
26  Bearing in mind that they use an interaction term and, therefore, their results are not wholly 
comparable with the ones reported in this paper.
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unemployment. At this point, research in the social sciences must be able to as-
sess the impact of these policies in order to provide policy-makers with informa-
tion for designing the necessary reforms. 
Our paper tried to asses to what extent ALMPs were successful in 28 European 
countries. We first analysed the evolution and rules governing the distribution 
of the ESF since its creation as a qualitative assignment of its capacity to foster 
ALMPs expenditure in Member States. We also included a review of previous 
empirical analyses that demonstrate the positive link between ALMPs expendi-
ture and employment growth in developed countries. 
In order to fit these results to current methodological techniques and to distin-
guish between EU countries with heterogeneous performance in their labour mar-
kets, we built and estimated a panel data model that captures the impact of public 
expenditure on ALMPs, apart from other fiscal and macroeconomic variables, on 
the employment rate. The model is estimated by GMM, assuming the possible 
presence of the endogeneity of the explanatory variables and the non-stationary 
behaviour of the variables. The sample was split in order to estimate separately 
the coefficients in core and periphery countries, as the latter experience a sig-
nificantly worse performance of the labour market. Finally, an alternative model 
assumed the stationarity of the variables, but a highly dynamic – autoregressive 
distributed lag – model.
Two main results were obtained from the quantitative analysis: firstly, the im-
pact of increasing ALMPs public expenditure on employment may be larger than 
the impact of public expenditure as a whole, although the current level of ALMPs 
seems to be near its optimum threshold; and secondly, public expenditure on 
ALMPs seems to be significantly more beneficial in those countries in which the 
ESF is largely present. Thus, the results seem to confirm the recent political strat-
egy focused on increasing the size of ESF transfers to Member States that suffer 
from higher unemployment rates. 
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Panel unit root test
 Levels First-Differences
 core Periphery Full sample core Periphery Full sample
emprate 0.655 –0.247 0.594 –8.360 –3.603 –7.317
P-value 0.74 0.40 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00
ALMP 0.578 1.372 2.181 –12.616 –8.260 –13.528
P-value 0.72 0.91 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
PLMP –0.788 1.379 1.770 –5.609 –4.666 –8.013
P-value 0.22 0.92 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
tfp 3.252 1.091 2.160 –8.103 –8.399 –10.678
P-value 1.00 0.86 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00
labprod 0.883 4.521 6.731 –9.627 –8.917 –12.872
P-value 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tot 0.566 –2.721 –3.407 –21.524 –25.344 –33.868
P-value 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
lodgdppc 1.705 –5.179 –5.411    
P-value 0.96 0.00 0.00    
pexp –1.258 –4.065 –4.039 –16.357 –17.286 –23.598
P-value 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
compempl –0.798 –2.649 –2.882 –24.765 –13.654 –24.183
P-value 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test. The null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root (although the 
parameter is not assumed to be identical across panels) is tested against the alternative that the fraction of panels 
that are stationary is nonzero. Cross-sectional averages are subtracted from the series in order to mitigate the 
impact of cross-sectional dependence.
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Table A2. Determinants of employment rate. Institutional variables 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
periphery core
empratet-1 0.3971*** 0.3998*** 0.3641*** 0.2060*** 0.1530** 0.1238**
0.050 0.063 0.058 0.057 0.064 0.061
ALMP 1.9872** 1.7753** 1.9241** –0.6361 –0.8466 –0.7171
0.770 0.792 0.806 0.485 0.531 0.482
PLMP –2.5596*** –2.3050*** –2.5990*** –2.4990*** –2.1381*** –2.5178***
0.276 0.315 0.294 0.330 0.410 0.333
tfp 0.1741*** 0.1251*** 0.1642*** 0.0112 0.0581 0.0125
0.037 0.042 0.039 0.043 0.064 0.044
tot –0.0139 0.0389 –0.0288 0.0020 0.0006 –0.0071
0.037 0.042 0.039 0.020 0.020 0.020
lodgdppc –0.1144 0.1458 0.5731 –0.0413 0.3082 1.4264
0.384 0.672 1.043 0.324 0.794 1.015
emprotection –0.1382 0.0853 –0.1365 0.1353 0.2141 –0.0050
0.236 0.256 0.444 0.219 0.252 0.344
tradeundens –0.0235 0.0078 –0.0204 –0.0131 –0.0150 –0.0932**
0.027 0.029 0.038 0.022 0.025 0.042
taxwedge –0.0277 –0.0173 0.0029 0.0570** 0.0432* 0.0495
0.027 0.026 0.058 0.024 0.024 0.041
Sargan test 
(p-value) [1] 174.5 (.78) 158.6 (.62) 161.2 (.82) 209.7 (.43) 198.3 (.19) 204.3 (.34)
Autocorr. Test 
(p-value) [2] –267 (.00) –2.96 (.00) –2.66 (.00) –2.84 (.00) –2.79 (.00) –2.78 (.00)
–1.01 (.30) –0.26 (.79) –1.08 (.27) –0.53 (.59) –0.30 (.76) –0.75 (.45)
time dummies no yes no no yes no
country-specific 
time trend no no yes no no yes
Obs. (groups) 199(11) 199(11) 199(11) 216 (10) 216 (10) 216 (10)
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
[1] Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.
[2] Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation (of order 1 and order 2) in the error term.
